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          Threats 
              to Academic Freedom 
              from Illinois’ New Ethics Law 
              By John K. Wilson 
            The State Officials and Employees Ethics Act is being applied to 
              academic settings in dubious ways, and the misinterpretations of 
              these rules pose a threat to academic freedom. 
            The clear intent of the new state ethics law was to address the 
              activities of political appointees in non-academic offices, who 
              might misuse public resources for purely political purposes. It 
              was not intended to restrict independent expressions of political 
              opinions by individuals, particularly in the academic context. Such 
              restrictions of political views on college campuses would not pass 
              constitutional scrutiny.
              Because the law was intended to address abuses in other state offices, 
              not state colleges, and because the “work time” restrictions 
              on faculty are exacerbated since there is no clear “work time” 
              for faculty, interpretation of these rules for college campuses 
              need to be radically changed.
              In a May 11, 2004 memo to state university and community college 
              general counsels, the new ethics rules were given a troubling interpretation 
              by the Inspector General. Although this memo proclaims it is not 
              a formal legal opinion, many colleges may be following this opinion 
              in enforcing the new law and in ethics training for faculty. Many 
              of the interpretations in the memo violate constitutional rights 
              of freedom of speech and academic freedom, and are also contrary 
              to the language of the ethics law.
              For example, state law prohibits use of state work facilities to 
              “prepare for, organize, or participate in any political meeting, 
              political rally, political demonstration, or other political event.” 
              The May 11, 2004 memo interprets this to mean, “This includes, 
              for example, sending an e-mail about a political rally to friends 
              and colleagues during work hours or from a work computer…” 
              This is an extreme misinterpretation of the law. An email informing 
              people about a political rally in no way constitutes organizing 
              a political rally using state resources. It is perfectly appropriate 
              for faculty, students, and staff at an institution of higher learning 
              to inform people about any meetings, rallies, or demonstration. 
              Any attempt to restrict this right is a clear violation of freedom 
              of speech and academic freedom.
              To most state employees, political rallies are inappropriate for 
              their work context. But in the academic context, political rallies 
              are often part of the larger educational mission. Far from being 
              silent, faculty often feel an obligation to inform students and 
              colleagues about political rallies and meetings because of the educational 
              value in serving the goals of getting students more actively involved.
              The same is true for other provisions in the memo. A ban on conducting 
              public opinion polls would normally be reasonable for state employees. 
              But in a class on public opinion polls, a faculty member surely 
              is allowed to engage in polling “on an issue” despite 
              what the memo says. (According to the memo, the ban also restricts 
              faculty from participating in a public opinion survey “at 
              work” even though the law itself only prohibits it during 
              “work time,” which for faculty is not the same thing.) 
              Other provisions in the memo must be clarified to protect freedom 
              of speech and academic freedom. For example, a professor who encourages 
              students to go and vote should never be thought to be violating 
              the rule against helping “get voters to the polls.” 
               
              The ethics law provisions requiring detailed descriptions of work 
              activity are already reasonably being interpreted as inappropriate 
              when applied to college faculty. The provisions restricting political 
              activity are also largely inappropriate in the academic context 
              and are not intended to restrict expression protected by freedom 
              of speech and academic freedom under the state and US constitutions.
              There is evidence that this ethics law is being interpreted in restrictive 
              ways. A student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
              who is also a third party candidate for state representative was 
              given a disciplinary ticket and warned because he used his uiuc.edu 
              email address to send out an email about his campaign. (This is 
              also a case of retaliation, since this student was apparently targeted 
              because he had complained about state employees under House speaker 
              Michael Madigan violating the ethics law by challenging his petitions 
              while working for the state.) 
              The Inspector General should withdraw the May 11, 2004 memo, and 
              inform state college general counsels that some of its recommendations 
              in that memo may violate the constitutional rights of state employees 
              on college campuses. Instead, a new memo of interpretation should 
              be adopted which does the following: 
              1) informs colleges that the new ethics law cannot supersede constitutional 
              protections for freedom of speech and academic freedom; 
              2) describes some of the cases of political expression which cannot 
              be restricted by the new law (instead of the current memo, which 
              restricts freedom beyond what the law demands); 
              3) clarifies that because faculty have flexible hours, all of their 
              political activities will be assumed to be conducted outside of 
              “work time”; 
              4) clarifies that restrictions of use of work facilities does not 
              impede the normal academic use of computers, telephones, email, 
              etc. for expression of ideas; 
              5) clarifies that the law does not apply to any activities done 
              for legitimate educational or research purposes; 
              6) urges colleges to inform employees of these facts and explicitly 
              note that academic employees retain academic freedom and free speech 
              rights.    
            
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