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The
Last Months:
The Decision to Close Barat and the Lessons to Learn
Joan
Berman
The decision to close
the newly merged college came after months of sometimes highly publicized
events that involved faculty, students, staff, alumni, and community
members. Many of these were collegial, peaceful protests, but in
the end they were unsuccessful. In the summer of 2003, the EVP for
Academic Affairs resigned. Although he had committed DePaul to the
acquisition of Barat two years before without widespread support
from the University’s constituencies, the new administration
decided almost immediately that it would not retain Barat.
Their predisposition to close the campus was predicated on a particular
assessment of the finances and future of the school. The dominant
narrative was developed by DePaul’s administration and the
Barat Task Force. The latter was organized by the administration
in the fall of 2003 and consisted of DePaul administrators predisposed
to close the Barat campus. Unfortunately, the Task Force reached
its conclusions without fully considering the alternative proposals
from the Barat community.
1. Recruitment Failures
The university neglected to develop and execute a coherent recruitment
strategy for Barat. It also overlooked the “Next Generation”
plan Barat had developed for increasing enrollment. That plan was
to serve the growing immigrant population in Lake County and would
have enhanced Barat’s financial situation.
2. Renovation Costs
Much of the argument turned on the rehabbing undertaken by DePaul
to bring historic Old Main up to code and to the university’s
plant standards. Barat’s operating budget accounted for only
2.5% of DePaul’s annual budget, but the money spent for renovation
and the actual figures for past and future renovation were a matter
of dispute throughout this debate — was exaggerated. DePaul
projected spending $400 million over ten years to renovate all of
the University’s infrastructure. Barat’s portion would
amount to a small fraction of this total. This was never put into
perspective. Barat was portrayed as representing irreparable harm
to DePaul’s financial health. 3. Operating Costs
One of the attractions of Barat was that it was a small liberal
arts suburban campus where students received individual attention.
Now the ratio of faculty to students was depicted as cost-inefficient.
The dominant culture of the controlling institution after the merger
determined the interpretation of these facts. Further frustration
arose from a series of blocked efforts to convey the “other
side of the story” and to show that adhering to “one
side of the story” would undermine a fully-informed choice.
This resulted in a misguided and potentially harmful decision for
the university and others. Many members of the Board never visited
the campus. The Barat attitude was that dialogue and a full hearing
of factors and alternatives could cultivate a collegial “win-win”
solution for DePaul and Barat. Among the blocked efforts were
Barat’s attempts 1) to use the media to inform the wider public,
including alumni, and gain a fair hearing from the DePaul Board
and administration, 2) to present 400 letters (from Barat advocates,
including alumni, students, faculty, administrators, and community
leaders) to the Board prior to the critical board meeting, 3) to
contact the Board by phone or in meetings to present Barat’s
side, and even such extreme measures as 4) ordering Barat staff
not to participate in efforts to save the college. Barat advocates
were consistently unable to communicate with the constituencies
of the University in order to give input into the Board’s
deliberations and to undermine institutional antagonism through
creative and persistent means. Ultimately, DePaul’s Board
and administration failed to solicit faculty opinion prior to the
merger. Before the Board made its final decision to close Barat,
it sent the question to the Faculty Council. Despite the Council’s
majority vote (14-11) to retain Barat, the Board chose to ignore
the recommendation of faculty, in essence circumventing shared governance
a second time. And finally, in addition to the lost jobs by
some faculty and most staff, the decision had dire consequences
for students. Students suffered, no matter how well intentioned
the efforts of faculty and administrators. Some students got caught
in the middle, unable to complete their programs at the campus of
their choice and were forced to transfer. Place-bound students were
particularly disadvantaged. Other students, not willing to embrace
a vastly different environment, refused to transfer to another campus
of the university. In the end, students in a culture of community,
especially in a small environment, experienced a bitter disappointment
at the deconstruction of their academic home.
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